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A MODERN PROCEDURE FOR NEW YORK
CHARLES E. CLARK
AN OPPORTUNITY to discuss reform of procedure in New York,
now made pertinent by the interest therein of the New York
Temporary Commission on the Courts,' is for me the occasion to re-
visit old scenes and familiar places. For my study of New York pro-
cedure, undertaken originally more or less by chance thirty-five years
ago, has been a continuing one and has provided me over the years
with an absorbing interest, both as onlooker and as student and
teacher. Although only a bystander, I have experienced real excite-
ment in following New York procedural developments, particularly
since one never knows what may happen next. A Washington taxi
driver, it is said, when asked as to the meaning of the motto on the
National Archives Building, "The Past Is Prologue," responded, true
to the philosophical bent of his guild, with this free translation: "You
ain't seen nothing yet." That, I think, well epitomizes the reactions
of at least this observer as the procedural precedents pile up. Let me
hasten to say that I do not intend this as a criticism of the individual
judges; they do a back-breaking job in trying to serve this vast and
teeming and amazingly growing commonwealth with inadequate tools
and an outworn judicial organization. But it is intended as a comment
on the unusual number and undue diversity of courts, the lack of a
businesslike direction, the inordinate congestion, confusion, and delay
now so usual a part of the American picture, and-grain for my imme-
diate grist-a resulting plethora of conflicting rulings as to how to do
things court-wise.2 And it lends emphasis, I trust, to another lack,
which I particularly wish to develop in this paper, namely, the absence
Charles E. Clark is Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit,
and former Dean, Yale University School of Law. This article in its original form was
delivered as an address before the New York State Bar Association, January 28, 1955,
and has been revised, with notes, for publication here.
1 See the Rep. of the Temp. Comm'n on the Courts 20-22 (Feb. 17, 1955), envisag-
ing a "major revision" of civil procedure in the state and announcing its undertaldng
"to organize an Advisory Committee of some of the outstanding procedural experts in
the State."
2 For a striking picture of the New York problem, see Bad Housekeeping: The Ad-
ministration of the New York Courts, Report of the Special Committee on Studies
and Surveys of the Administration of Justice of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York. For more general discussions, see Vanderbilt, The Essentials of a
Sound Judicial System, 48 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1 (1953); Clark & Rogers, The New Judiciary
Act of Puerto Rico: A Definitive Court Reorganization, 61 Yale L.J. 1147 (1952);
Clark, The Evershed Report and English Procedural Reform, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1046
(1954). The confusion in New York pleading precedents, adverted to below, is the
mainstay of many procedural courses. Note in passing the cases in Clark, Cases on Mod-
em Pleading (1952) and the discussions in Clark, Code Pleading (2d ed. 1947).
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here of a true philosophy of procedural jurisprudence to give guidance
and direction to the lonely harassed trial judge. Under existing condi-
tions there perhaps must be that blithesome disregard of any con-
trariety of opinion or past troublesome precedent which makes each
new decision somewhat of a surprise Christmas package and a joy to
the law teacher, whatever it may be to the practicing lawyer or judge.
For it was from the standpoint of law teaching that I initially
approached this subject. I started in as a teacher at Yale in 1919
expecting to work in the careful and safe subject of property law.
Soon, however, I found myself sidetracked to make way for a more
distinguished expositor of that law. But since no professor would so
belittle himself as to accept willingly assignment to the field of pro-
cedure, and since I was young and defenseless, I inherited the pleading
courses by default. So with great misgivings and at least silent protest
I began to teach this subject; and I have been at it ever since, as a
current pile of examination papers has served to remind me. Among
early fruits of my teaching labors-in fact an initial trial of my wings,
so to speak-was an article for the Columbia Law Review entitled
"The Union of Law and Equity," published in January 192. It was
an extensive critique of the New York cases, notably the famous case
of Jackson v. Strong,4 with its classic statement, "The inherent and
fundamental difference between actions at law and suits in equity
cannot be ignored,"5 and its ultimate repudiation of the legislative
and constitutional mandate for union of a hundred years earlier by its
endlessly disputed admonition for the dismissal of a case brought on
the supposedly "wrong side" of the court.
Almost immediately after the publication of this article I was
gratified to note its republication on the editorial pages of the esteemed
New York Law Journal, surely a feather in the cap of an inconspicuous
legal fledgling. Nevertheless, upon completion of the several install-
ments I was surprised to find that the editor, who, I believe, was then
the very able Professor I. M. Wormser, ended the series with a warm
editorial on the audacity of so unwarranted an attack upon the great
New York Court of Appeals. Thereafter there ensued quite a lively
dispute by way of letters. Some distinguished lawyers wrote support-
ing my viewpoint, some taking that of the editor, while others, perhaps
the prevailing ones, concluded that on the specific issue it made little
difference, in view of the calendar delays, whether a case was dismissed
or retained on the docket for amendment.0 Thus encouraged as to the
3 25 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1925).
4 222 N.Y. 149, 118 N.E. 512 (1917).
5 Id. at 154, 118 N.E. at 513.
6 The publication and resulting dispute continued in that eminent publication, as I
recall, for upwards of a month during the winter of 1925.
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immediate vitality of the subject, I returned to it with renewed zest,
which continues even now as I accept the teaching of pleading as a
refreshing pause in judicial duties. At the moment I have just com-
pleted a course at the Yale Law School which I entitle Modern Plead-
ing, but which may be considered as perhaps a judicious intermixture
of federal light and state dusk.y If New York does enter upon a defi-
nite program of improvement, I shall lose some of my capital assets
of examples of things not to be done. But since my teaching days must
soon draw to a close because of the onset of age, if not for the press
of other circumstances, I shall view with equanimity and indeed much
pleasure the dawn of a new day in New York procedure.
At any rate, the New York Temporary Commission on the Courts
very wisely has chosen the subject of improvement in "Practice and
Procedure" as one of its major activities. While this was listed first in
the scope of the Commission's study,8 it has, I think, developed as one
of the later ones to be tackled. I do not understand that this is more
than coincidental or that it indicates any rating as to priority in
the field. Nor should I wish to suggest priorities, for all of the Com-
mission's assigned tasks are major and their accomplishment of vital
importance to the state. In terms of need one cannot properly place
one requirement above another. Thus, what can be more important
than the simplification of the court structure and the placing of the
hitherto various warring and conflicting elements under one business-
like direction? At the same time, what can be more important than the
improvement in the orderly procedure of a single court? Each goes
to the heart of the problem of administering justice. Each fulfills a
demand of modem times. But there is one aspect which may justify
a certain measure of priority to reform of practice and procedure in
the courts. That is because it is the one matter for which there is
needed for its accomplishment a proper philosophy and for which
in natural course one will necessarily be developed if improvement is
attempted.9 Probably, too, the lack thereof represents the greatest
defect in New York procedure over the years. Had there been a genu-
ine philosophy of procedure and its appropriate place in litigation, the
various diversities in the separate courts would undoubtedly have been
less magnified. For want of any such philosophy, individual judges
7 See Clark, Cases on Modem Pleading.
8 Preliminary Rep. of the Temp. Comm'n on the Courts 11 (March 5, 1954). See
also the 1955 Report, supra note 1.
9 Clark, Code Pleading, sub noma. Development of Procedural Jurisprudence 69-71;
Chorley, Procedural Reform in England, in David Dudley Field Centenary Essays 98,
99-102 (1949); Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes
and Rules, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 493, 507, 508 (1950); Chorley, Pleading: A Subject for
Scientific Study?, 12 Mod. L. Rev. 319 (1949).
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have been necessarily limited to following their own diverse tendencies
and trends. But I am encouraged to believe that once a philosophy is
developed, all the other reforms on the Commission's natural agenda
will fall into place and will follow in almost necessary consequence.
To illustrate what I mean, I need refer only to that most modern
procedural device, to wit, discovery. One cannot approach the subject
of discovery without developing willy-nilly a philosophy of pleading
and procedure, be it good or bad. If one feels, with the settled older
view, that discovery leads only to a "fishing expedition," the mere
thought of which is distasteful, then one instinctively is viewing a law-
suit as a proper place for the display of tactics or strategy and hold-
ing it to be essentially a contest of movement and countermovement
between opponents whose equal reserves of skill must be assumed. In
this view surprise is a necessary and vital element. The truth is not
to be sought by merely obtaining from the opponents or their witnesses
advance knowledge of what they are saying about the matter in dis-
pute. It can be developed only as a result of the shock of sudden at-
tack at the actual trial itself. On the other hand, if the modern dis-
covery as set out in the Federal Rules is to be accepted at all, it must
be on the theory that the real purpose of modern pleading and its
accessory devices, including discovery, is to inform all parties and the
court completely and at a very early stage of what the dispute is about,
that it may be approached intelligently, a settlement arranged if at all
possible, or a trial had as to the actual points at issue.10
Now if one is going to accept the modern philosophy as exempli-
fied by this approach to discovery, it is surely going to color the ap-
proach to the entire system of civil trials. I may add that without
doubt it is also going to permeate and shape vitally our approach to
criminal trials-though that is not a matter within my immediate
assignment.1 The acceptance generally throughout our practice, how-
ever, of the philosophy which permeates the discovery procedure can
well have most important and substantial consequences. Its thorough
adoption necessarily means that mere rules of pleading as such can
have no vitality for their own sake, but only as accessories to achiev-
ing the objective thus visualized by the discovery process itself. Thus
the rules of the game need not be enforced unless they are clearly a
part of the process whereby court and litigant alike learn quickly of
10 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500, 501, 507 (1947). See contra: Hawknsl,
Discovery and Rule 34: What's So Wrong About Surprise?, 39 A.BAJ. 1075 (19S3),
28 Conn. BJ. 33 (1954); but compare Holtzoff, The Elimination of Surprise in Federal
Practice, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 576 (1954).
11 For examples of the lessened influence of detailed criminal pleading, see United
States v. McKee, 220 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1955) ; United States v. Achtner, 144 F2d 49, 51
(2d Cir. 1944).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
June 195]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the real merits of the dispute. Any rules merely to vindicate the plead-
ing process as such, turning only upon how well principles and prac-
tices of pleading alone have been carried out, will no longer have
validity.
One is likely to ask at once, What, then, is left of the whole sys-
tem of practice? or more pointedly, What criteria are actually to be
established in carrying out our pleading principles? The answer seems
to me clear. It is just so much procedure, no more and no less, as will
advance the objectives we have in mind, namely, the conveying of in-
formation as to the case involved. This is not, as might be thought, a
counsel of despair but is a very worth-while and working principle.
As I have endeavored to teach for many years, there are or should be
no absolutes in pleading. Pleading is a form of red tape but of de-
sirable red tape, indeed one essential to the orderly processes of jus-
tice.12 It should be resorted to where it leads to orderly, convenient,
efficient activity in court litigation; but it should go no further. We
must have enough; we shall get hopelessly enmeshed if we have too
much. 13
Now to implement these conclusions, which thus far may seem
indefinite, I suggest that in the past we have made the mistake of
assuming some ideal system, erected by court, counsel, or scholars,
and have not tried the more simple course of asking, What will the
individual human protagonist before us be able to give us? My own
answer, in substitution for an unreal perfectionism, is that we should
require that amount of pleading detail which the bar can normally give
us. By this I mean what is habitual and convenient by training, tradi-
tion, and experience. It is natural for lawyers who talk in legal terms
to describe a lawsuit involving an automobile accident, say, or the
breach of a contract, in ways which will be familiar to their immediate
readers, who are the opposing lawyers and the judges, and who can,
in turn, translate the legal phraseology to their lay clients so far as
that may be necessary. Thus I have always regarded the use of the
old so-called common counts in pleading assumpsit at the common law
as a very natural course today. For it is language familiar to the law-
yer of any professional training at all. So the words "money had and
received" are words of art with a long established meaning for the
12 Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules,
3 Vand. L. Rev. 493, 507 (1950).
13 "One of the most difficult and one of the most permanent problems which a legal
system must face is a combination of a due regard for the claims of substantial justice
with a system of procedure rigid enough to be workable. It is easy to favour one qual-
ity at the expense of the other, with the result that either all system is lost, or there is
so elaborate and technical a system that the decision of cases turns almost entirely upon
the working of its rules and only occasionally and incidentally upon the merits of the
cases themselves." 2 Holdsworth, A History of English Law 251 (4th ed. 1936).
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lawyers. Why reject the actual communication of thought it does give
to court and opposing counsel for some theoretical striving for per-
fection in expression which actually may be less sophisticated and
hence less expressive?14
On the other hand, undue emphasis upon the pleading of facts
is self-defeating. There comes a time when we simply cannot expect
that any lawyer, be he skillful or unskillful, is going to go into the
details some judges and some lawyers think necessary, at least from
opponents. With the increasing sophistication of the modem age as to
modes of intercommunication of ideas, we have come to realize that
there is a technique of apparent disclosure which may be utilized to
conceal and to prevent the transference of thought. So a requirement
that lawyers tell facts beyond what they wish to do or beyond what
they can do easily and skillfully is self-defeating. An efficient lawyer
knows how to meet any requirement of a bill of particulars or more
definite statement and still preserve to himself sufficient generality for
eventualities which he must meet, while the unskilled lawyer will reach
the same result by not knowing how to fulfill the seemingly drastic re-
quirements. In either event we have not achieved anything except
delaying of the process by trying to seek for a kind of mythical ideal
in our advance paper work or pretrial shadowboxing.1 5
Instead of pressing for more pleading detail we should turn to
the modem devices of pretrial, discovery, and summary judgment; for
by their processes of reaching at once to the party himself, rather than
to his lawyer, they may actually obtain further clarification of what
did happen with respect to the concrete issues dividing the parties.
Here, too, the process is one of using the means of legal communica-
tion for what they can do readily, not one of trying to employ them as
ends or requirements in themselves. When they are failing in their
objective, then they should be cut short and the case returned to the
docket for the ordinary methods of trial.1"
14 Use of the common counts in modern pleading is discussed, with citations, in
Clark, Code Pleading 287-96. See also, Cook, "Facts" and "Statements of Fact," 4 U. of
Chi. L. Rev. 233 (1937); King, The Use of the Common Counts in California, 14 So.
Calif. L. Rev. 288 (1941); Comment, 4 Calif. L. Rev. 352 (1916).
15 "A lawyer, therefore, cannot safely or wisely restrict the case he offers to prove
before he knows what the testimony will actually show. And generally speaking, he does
not need to; he can evade the rule, if a court tries to enforce it by saying too much,
rather than too little. I recall one lawyer of wide experience who protected himself com-
pletely by regularly inserting the same two typewritten pages, not all of which could
possibly be apposite, of formal negligence allegations in each automobile accident com-
plaint he drew. After all, no real penalty has been devised for making an excess of
allegations." Clark, Simplified Pleading, A.B.A. Judicial Administration Monographs,
Ser. A, No. 18, pp. 5, 6, reprinted in 1942 Handbook of National Conference of Judicial
Councils 136, 2 F.R.D. 456, 457 (1943), 27 Iowa L. Rev. 272, 274 (1942).
16 There is need of more objective studies, such as that conducted under the aus-
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This is, therefore, to make of pleading an entirely pragmatic device
for use by the courts. If it works, it is desirable; when it ceases to
work, it is no longer desirable. Here, I think, is the modern spirit of
pleading-a spirit altogether too little emphasized in the days of code
pleading, even though that system ideally was one of telling the story
of the case merely. Code pleading went astray because of undue em-
phasis upon pleading the facts-an impossible requirement when made
an end objective in itself. It can be reinvigorated by the change in
emphasis I have suggested.17
Where and how is this to be achieved? I make no bones of say-
ing simply and directly that I think it is best to be achieved now in
any American state by adoption of the Federal Rules. This is not to
say that the Federal Rules are necessarily the best of all conceivable
systems or that they must be copied blindly. But it is to say that they
represent the best fruits of experience now available of just that kind
of court auxiliary aid, assisting, but not dominating, the judicial proc-
ess, which I have visualized. They are by no means the last word
on the subject. Fifty or one hundred years hence we may well have
developed better methods, just as these would not have been wise or
readily available one hundred years ago. Pleading should always be a
process of improving and bringing alive, resharpening, and perfecting
the tools by which the result of sound administration of justice is to
be achieved. For the present era, however, the Federal Rules are the
tested, tried, and effective device as their successful transference to
so many state practices is now demonstrating."8
Evidence to this same effect is indeed provided in your own Civil
Practice Act, which is accepting many and an ever-increasing number
of the Federal Rules. I have not made a complete study but may
refer, by way of example, to the rules of party joinder. Those rules
pices of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Speck, The Use of Dis-
covery in United States District Courts, 60 Yale LJ. 1132 (1951). See also, Wright,
Wegner & Richardson, The Practicing Attorney's View of the Utility of Discovery, 12
F.R.D. 97 (1952); Comment, Tactical Use and Abuse of Depositions under the Federal
Rules, 59 Yale L.J. 117 (1949).
17 Note the recent discussion of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) among lawyers of the
Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, Claim or Cause of Action, 13 F.R.D. 253-79 (1953),
and the Advisory Committee's response thereto, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amend-
ments 8, 9 (May 1954).
18 At the present writing the Federal Rules have been adopted fully in Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, Now Mexico,
Puerto Rico, and Utah; also in Delaware, but separately for the courts of law and of
chancery, which are not merged; and it is expected that they will be adopted in North
Dakota this summer. Substantial portions, such as the discovery or joinder sections,
have been adopted in Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, New York, Penn.
sylvania, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington, while lesser parts appear in California,
Connecticut, Montana, Oregon, and the existing practice of North Dakota. In addition,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 on pretrial procedure has been very widely copied.
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-including not merely joinder of plaintiffs and of defendants gener-
ally,"9 but also the auxiliary devices of intervention, third-party im-
pleader, and interpleader 20 -either are quite literally federal rules or
else stem therefrom. So, too, the procedure for reservation of decision
on a motion for a directed verdict stems from Federal Rule 50(b).2
And so also pretrial and discovery, 2 as they develop and expand in
this state, tend more and more to follow the federal model. And that,
I take it as reformers agree, is the general goal.23
With so much already accomplished it would be, I think, a matter
of but little difficulty for the bench and bar to take over the rest of
the rules. Hence, a really complete reform may be achieved without
strain, once the objective is understood and accepted. But anything
less than this is quite undesirable. As I have elsewhere pointed out,
piecemeal reform is often worse than no reform at all. It requires the
local lawyers to learn as a new procedure a curious hybrid between
state and federal practice; it has all the difficulties of being new and
strange so far as the process of learning is concerned but remaining
old and tired so far as real results are looked for. The teaching of ex-
perience is to abhor such a wasteful and time-serving delay of real
reform. 24
To illustrate the thesis that hard-won victories from bitter ex-
perience, as disclosed in the Federal Rules, should not now be lost, I
may refer to one or two examples from current New York procedure.
So let us look at the present fortunes of the demurrer. Now the
common-law demurrer was often useful as a means of testing the legal
right under which a party was suing or defending. It was a short cut
modestly effective in those cases where the real issue was one of law
and the parties were willing to have it so decided. But often it became
an instrumentality of delay when there was no possibility of reaching
a final adjudication through its means. Moreover, it had become en-
crusted with a wealth of formalistic restrictions making it not an
efficient method of testing a pleading or ascertaining preliminarily the
merits of the action. Hence, one of the most insistent demands of
39 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 212, as amended in N.Y. Laws 1949, c. 147, in substitution
for the former §§ 209, 211, 212. See also, id. § 193, and the article by Clark & Wright,
infra note 32.
20 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 193-a, 193-b, and compare §§ 28S, 286.
21 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act. § 457-a. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b) is found in 28 U.S.C. ff.
§ 2072 (1952).
22 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Rules 121, 121-a, 122.
23 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 61-66 (1952); N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 66-69 (1951);
Note, 52 Col. L. Rev. 1071 (1952).
24 Clark-, Dissatisfaction with Piecemeal Reform, 24 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 121 (1940);
Clark, The Texas and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 Texas L. Rev. 4, S (1941).
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modern reform has been the abolition of the demurrer and the substi-
tution of some more effective device for the pretesting of a case.1
In New York the reform took the form of announcing that the
demurrer was abolished and substituting therefor several different
types of motions, of which the motion for judgment was the most in-
clusive. A distinguished commentator (Professor Henry W. Ballan-
tine) has referred to this substitution as "as ludicrous a piece of self-
deception as the old fictions in ejectment." 2 To a certain extent this
criticism was justified, because the motions which had succeeded the
demurrer were given separate categorization, so much so that they
were not interchangeable one with another, and a special type of mo-
tion was still needed for each kind of objection. Thus the new system
had little, if any, more flexibility than the old and was about as tech-
nical in actual application.27
By the time the Federal Rules were adopted there had been an
accumulation of experience in American reform with respect to the
demurrer. There was also at hand the English system, wherein the de-
murrer had been abolished and there was substituted the objection in
law, to be raised in the answer and heard at trial along with other de-
fenses at the trial except when the court directed an earlier hearing.-8
The original federal rule, Rule 12(b), represented an intermediate
step between the more limited American and the more complete Eng-
lish reform. It provided in effect for a motion for a judgment which
could be used in place of an answer raising questions of law if the
pleader so chose; and on this there would be a preliminary hearing un-
less the judge should decide to postpone the matter for better dis-
position at the trial. Thus, while the English procedure tended to push
consideration of the objection to the actual trial, the original federal
procedure tended in the opposite direction, with, nevertheless, power
to the judge to follow the English practice.2 9
That federal procedure was a very real advance, as experience
showed; but it also disclosed confusion between the motion for sum-
mary judgment and the motion for judgment on the pleadings. The
former is what has come to be called a speaking motion, containing
25 Millar, The Fortunes of the Demurrer, 31 IIl. L. Rev. 596 (1937); Pike, Objec-
tions to Pleadings under the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 47 Yale L.J. So
(1937); Clark, Code Pleading 535-45.
20 Shipman, Common-Law Pleading 294 (3d ed., Ballantine, 1923). See also, Millar,
Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective 187-88 (1952).
27 Some modification, although not complete, was made in 1944 on recommenda-
tion of the N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 305-33 (1944). See Prashker, New York's Rules of
Civil Practice Affecting Motions Directed to Pleadings: The Revision of 1944, 19 St.
John's L. Rev. 1 (1944).
28 The Supreme Court, Order 25, rules 1, 2 (The Annual Practice 1955).
20 See Clark, supra note 15.
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allegations of fact, and is of course clearly permissible, unlike the
speaking demurrer of the common law, whose sin of fact-allegation
placed it quite beyond the pale. If, therefore, the motion for judgment
is but a modem substitute for the demurrer, it, too, must be so limited
-a resulting distinction among motions so narrow as to defy detec-
tion, but of decisive, not to say cataclysmic, consequences to the
pleader. Little wonder that the majority view was that, since the
summary-judgment motion under Rule 56 so clearly was by very
essence a speaking motion, it was but a quibble to deny such effect to
a motion for judgment under Rule 12(b) . Some of us thought,
therefore, that there ought preferably to be only one inclusive motion,
namely, that for a summary judgment, under a proper form of pro-
cedure. Nevertheless, when the Advisory Committee came to prepare
the 1938 amendments, the objections and lack of professional familiar-
ity with these newer processes suggested that an attempt at over-
simplification might seem to leave a confusing hiatus in the practice.
So it was decided to retain both motions in form, but to provide for
easy, if not imperceptible, transfer from one to the other. Under the
amended rule, therefore, and in usual normal course the motion for
judgment becomes a motion for summary judgment whenever matter
outside the pleadings proper is presented to the court for its considera-
tion.31 All this might seem an excess of machinery for a simple result,
and it is a solution which would hardly have lent itself to a priori in-
vention. But it works, and works well. Experience has thus forged a
highly efficient and working solution which follows the habits and
thoughts of lawyers and announces no startling innovations but pro-
duces the desirable results. It is this kind of experience which should
not be lightly rejected in hope of some new flash of genius for getting
rid-of the pesky old demurrer.
Another example stems from the subject matter of my old article
in the Columbia Law Review to which I have adverted above, namely,
"The Union of Law and Equity." That is the subject which probably
has caused the most confusion and difficulty in New York, where the
early resistance to the infant Code led to the resurrecting by the court
30 The cases were summarized in Rep. of Proposed Amendments 11-15 (June 1946),
H.R. Doc. No. 473, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 55-59 (1947) (Advisory Committee's note to
the amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12[bI); Clark, Code Pleading 540-45.
31 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), as amended, effective March 19, 1948. For the present pro-
cedure, see Gibson v. Security Trust Co., 201 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1953); Sardo v. McGrath,
196 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1952); William J. Kelly Co. v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.,
172 F.2d 865 (1st Cir. 1949); Mechanical Devices Co. v. General Builders, 15 N.J. 566,
105 A.2d 673 (1954); Clark, Experience under the Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, in 1953 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Title 28, U.S. Code Ju-
diciary and Judicial Procedure 1, 6, 14.
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of distinctions or different "sides" of a single court which were quite
unnecessary as well as unreal in actual practice. Nevertheless, there
have been serious problems raised by various important decisions of
the New York courts.3 The two most questionable steps in New
York had to do with, first, the matter of what cases could be claimed
to a jury and, second, the matter of waiver of jury trial . 3
As to the first, the New York statute attempted to provide certain
types of actions which could be thus claimed as of right to a jury, such
as claims for a sum of money due, ejectment, and so on.8 4 The ques-
tion immediately arose whether the intent of this statute was to pro-
vide an entirely new and separate test or whether it was merely declar-
atory of the constitutional principle.85  From time to time the New
York court has announced that this was purely a matter of statutory
construction and that the constitutional test would not prevail. The
consequence has been a large measure of confusion and chaos. That is
quite natural, because thus there is developed an area of conflict be-
tween the two. For example, an equitable action for cancellation and
reformation of, say, an insurance policy and eventually for the pay-
ment of money under it is historically only for the court of chancery
but may now seem to be for the jury under the statute as being em-
bodied in a complaint claiming a sum of money due. The code states
where the union of law and equity has been most successful have not
attempted any such dichotomy or convenient source of error as this
attempt to enlarge upon the constitution by means of statutory defini-
tions. The usual test is simply the historical one of what cases were
32 Among extensive recent discussions the following may be cited: Proposals under
Consideration by the Judicial Council Relating to Completing the Merger of Legal and
Equitable Remedies, N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 293-314 (1954); Kharas, A Century of
Law-Equity Merger in New York, 1 Syracuse L. Rev. 186 (1949); Clark & Wright,
The Judicial Council and the Rule-Making Power: A Dissent and a Protest, 1 Syracuse
L. Rev. 346, 353-57 (1950); Note, Law and Equity in New York-Still Unmerged, S5
Yale L.J. 826 (1946).
33 Involved also is the question whether an action brought to the "wrong side" of
the court should be dismissed or transferred; on this, compare Wainwright & Page, Inc.
v. Burr & McAuley, 272 N.Y. 130, 5 N.E.2d 64 (1936), with Terner v. Glicksteln &
Terner, Inc., 283 N.Y. 299, 28 N.E.2d 846 (1940). The lower courts have been in very
great confusion and the court of appeals did not take the occasion on its reversal of
April Productions, Inc. v. Schirmer, Inc., 283 App. Div. 1037, 284 App. Div. 639, 131
N.Y.S.2d 341 (1st Dep't 1954), to clarify the matter. 308 N.Y. 366, 126 N.E.2d 283
(1955).
34 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 425.
35 Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. Andersen & Co., 239 N.Y. 285, 146 N.E. 381
(1925), is perhaps the leading case rejecting the historical for the statutory test, al-
though the New York cases are not uniform. See criticism, Clark, Trial of Actions
under the Code, 11 Cornell L.Q. 482, 490 (1926); Clark, Code Pleading 103-06; James,
Trial by jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 Yale L.J. 1022, 1035 (1936),
and authorities cited note 32 supra.
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historically triable to the jury; obviously those are the ones in which
by constitutional intent the right is preserved and protected."0
As to the other major point of jury waiver, the original New York
Code worked out a system where a waiver of jury had to be by affirma-
tive act;3" and the consequence was that a litigant might well delay his
definitive action until he saw how he was making out before the judge.
Here, too, the correct solution of other code states is that waiver oc-
curs by failure to act, namely, to claim trial by jury promptly and
decisively. More recently the need of such a decisive test has been
perceived here, so that the failure-to-claim provision of the present
jury-waiver statute is being constantly extended to provide for its use
in increasing areas-county by county-in metropolitan New York
City. 8 No reason- seems apparent why this beneficent result should
not be at once available to the entire state.
All this experience to which I have adverted, coming from Eng-
land and from some 20 or more American states and territories and
British Dominions, was available to the framers of the Federal Rules
and is indeed cited in the Advisory Committee's original note to Fed-
eral Rule 38.3" In view of this knowledge federal law-equity merger,
which for years had been viewed with apprehension, has actually been
achieved easily and simply and without appreciable friction.40 On the
other hand, in New York today the Judicial Council has once again set
its hand to complete the work started in 1848 and to try now at length
to achieve a definitive merger.
This is a wholly praiseworthy endeavor, but the problems attend-
ant upon its execution show the difficulties of piecemeal reform to be
achieved only by rigid and formal statutes. Thus, in its comprehensive
386 Among cases see, e.g., Rocha v. Roha, 197 Cal. 396, 240 Pac. 1010 (1925); Bar-
ber v. Baldwin, 13S Conn. 558, 67 A.2d 1 (1949); Warner v. Coleman, 107 Okla. 292,
231 Pac. 1055 (1924); and under federal practice, Prudential Ins. Co. v,. Strickland, 187
F2d 67 (6th Cir. 1951); Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 813 (1948); Bruckman v. Hollzer, 152 F2d 730 (9th Cir. 1946).
37 N.Y. Code of Proc. § 221 (1848).
38 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 426, as amended, with which may be contrasted Fed. R.
Civ. P. 38, substantially the English rule, Order 36, rule 1, via Connecticut, Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 7936 (1949) ; for collection of statutes and rules see Report of the Advisory Com-
mittee on Rules for Civil Procedure 95 (1936) (note to Fed R. Civ. P. 38). The diffi-
culties of the New York provision are illustrated by Jackson v. Strong, 222 N.Y. 149, 118
N.E. 512 (1917), and its progeny. The opposing rule is illustrated by cases such as
Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Ryan, 211 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1954); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Krout,
157 F.2d 912, 913 (2d Cir. 1946); Groome v. Steward, 142 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cr. 1944);
Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 136 F.2d 796, 797 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
39 See note 38 supra. The earlier apprehension is noted in Clark & Mfoore, A
New Federal Civil Procedure-I. The Background, 44 Yale L.J. 387, 394, 395 (1935);
Clark, Code Pleading 32 and n.l.
40 As the cases cited notes 36, 38 supra help to show.
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study in 195441 the Council recommended an amendment of New
York Civil Practice Act Section 479 to take off the shackles presented
by the demand for judgment as locally construed. But then in order
thoroughly to negative previous restrictive precedents, it suggested a
new section, 111-a, to provide for free amendment between law and
equity.42 However worthy the objective, this recognition of some need
for amendment within the confines of the present unitary court can
be made operable only by resurrecting the outmoded separate "sides"
of that court. So the Council decided 43 (most wisely, in my opinion)
to recommend only the amendment to Section 479.44
Reform by de-emphasis and gradualism is therefore my thesis,
and its prime illustration the Federal Rules. For their innovation is
the showing of a complete and integrated system which brings together
all existing best practices scattered among jurisdictions rather than
the novelty of the separate parts. Just the other day I noted support
for this philosophy of gradualism from a high and informed source,
namely, the distinguished legal biographer, Catherine Drinker Bowen,
in a recent Atlantic magazine. Pointing out that her studies have led
her to the courtroom and the legislature and thus to a perception of
"the extraordinary importance of procedure," she records herself as
particularly impressed -with one thing, thus: "If reform in law is to
come at all, it must come slowly or it will not stick. When it comes
fast it boomerangs, or else we laymen ignore the new law."-45 Of course
she need not have limited her acute observation to the reaction of
laymen; it applies with equal force to lawyers and judges. But the
Federal Rules would fit her standards well. They show not undue
precipitateness but only a practical and effective response to modern
41 Note 32 supra.
42 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 83-85, 298 (1954).
43 N.Y. Jud. Council Rep. 72-73 (1955).
44 The amendment passed both houses of the New York legislature but was vetoed
by Governor Harriman on April 25, 1955. This proposed revision of N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Act § 479 would have brought it in accord with the highly successful Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c)
and thus eliminated the problem of dismissal, note 33 supra, and necessarily tended to a
more effective merger of law and equity. See Clark, Code Pleading 265-70. The Committee
on State Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, in Bull,
No. 7, p. 471 (April 21, 1955), had urged a veto in an analysis wbich seems to the
writer signally oblivious to the confusion of the New York cases and the success of the
proposed remedial legislation as shown by the more usual code pleading, as well as by
the Federal Rules. The limited viewpoint shown in this analysis suggests in itself, it is
believed, the desirability of the complete and integrated federal reform, as opposed to
attempts at piecemeal improvement. And the rather blithe and imperceptive adoption
of a position which is fundamentally at war with the Association's own outstanding lead-
ership in New York court reform discloses the lamentable consequences of that lack of a
philosophy of procedural jurisprudence which the writer has so often deplored.
45 Bowen, By Slow Degrees, 195 The Atlantic 53, 55, 56 (Feb. 1955).
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court needs, as the experience of a dozen or more important American
jurisdictions now shows"
My support of the federal system as a working model for state
practice is not limited merely to the contents of the rules but includes
also the manner of their adoption and later supervision, namely,
through court rule-making. Control of court administration, even to
the details of its practice, should be active and continuous; it should
be in the hands of those who have both the continuing responsibility
and the expert knowledge; it should be done by the courts. Court rule-
making is thus as important a part of the ideal court as is its integra-
tion into one single, efficient, closely knit structure.4 7
I hope and trust that this is the worthy prospect for the Com-
mission's dreams. Its current proposals for judicial conferences among
all the high court judges4 may well serve to break the ice, although,
as I believe the Commission realizes, these are but beginning and lim-
ited steps, lacking dynamic authority. Certainly the warm response
which even these somewhat hesitant measures have received from the
press and public should give the Commission heart to go forward more
boldly. And for the New York State Bar Association there can be no
finer task than to help the Commission bring to reality its dreams for
the better administration of justice. For this is truly a lawyer's task.
We cannot expect laymen to put the house of the law in order; while
they may sense that something or a great deal is wrong, theirs is not
the knowledge or the experience to know how to do this well and skill-
fully. We, the lawyers, must do it ourselves. Bar associations tend to
overlook this responsibility lying directly before them while they go
off on all sorts of strange joy rides ranging from attempted control of
governmental foreign policy to definite anticonstitutionalism and
emasculation of important provisions of the Bill of Rights. I urge that
the lawyer stick to his own last and that he and his duly dedicated or-
ganizations accept the public charge to keep the tools of justice keen
and bright.
46 See note 18 supra.
47 See Clark & Wright, op. cit. supra note 32, and the authorities on the modem
integrated court cited note 2 supra.
48 Rep. of the Temp. Comm'n on the Courts 13-16 (Feb. 17, 1955).
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